This paper considers a model of two interconnected networks with different qualities. There are call externalities in the sense that consumers value calls they send and receive. Networks compete in two part tariffs.
Introduction
Analyzing telecommunications liberalization naturally leads to separate the analysis of two dynamic phases. During the transitory stage following the opening to competition, the incumbent's network represents an essential facility for new competitors. The main risk of anti-competitive practices is then concerned by the abuse of dominant position which could conduct to the new competitors' foreclosure. Access pricing in this framework has given rise to numerous papers over the last few years 1 . The telecommunication sector will enter a mature phase once competitors will have developed a sufficiently large geographic coverage allowing them to connect Þnal users directly. This is the case in mobile
telecommunications. This will arise in the Þxed link network when the local loop will be effectively competitive 2 . Nevertheless, networks will continue to be interconnected in order to keep the advantages of network externalities. In this context, the main risk of anti-competitive practices will probably reside in tacit collusion. Recent literature on this issue (Armstrong (1998), Laffont, Rey, Tirole (1998a,b), Carter and Wright (1999) ) shows that interconnected network providers may collude tacitly through high access charges.
New telecommunication providers will try naturally to differentiate their products in order to segment the market and to lower competition. This differentiation can have horizontal or a vertical dimension. Telecommunication services of different qualities can be offered. For example, a mobile telecommunication network can be considered of a higher quality than a Þxed link network.
Consumers can call and be called at any period in the day.
When consumers can adopt only one network, two kinds of calls have to be distinguished: calls between consumers of the same network ("on-net calls") and calls destined to the rival network ("off-net calls"). Off-net calls give rise to the payment of an access charge to the destined network. This distinction leads to study two regulatory questions.
First, does price discrimination between on-net and off-net calls have to be authorized by regulatory agencies ? Such price discrimination is for example in practice for calls between Þxed link and mobile networks or even between same quality networks 3 . This kind of pricing's goal is to create bandwagon effects in order for price discrimination to restore tariff-mediated network externalities despite interconnection. Indeed, the higher the number of consumers adopting a network, the higher is the probability for a call to be on-net. This reduces the total cost for consumers if on-net calls are priced lower than off-net calls. A complementary question concerns the receiver payer principle.
Second, can public authorities let competitors freely negotiate their access prices or is there a need for regulation at least in a transitory regime ? An intermediate solution consists in imposing a reciprocity principle. This rule has the advantage to be easily veriÞable by regulatory agencies.
Recent literature has focussed on the possible anticompetitive use of access charges between interconnected networks. Armstrong (1998) and Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1998a) show that high access prices conduct to a 'raising each other cost effect' in a linear pricing context and when providers cannot price discriminate between on-net and off-net calls. This effect partially or totally disappears when providers can operate a price discrimination between on-net and off-net calls (Laffont et al.(1998b) ) or when they compete in non-linear prices (Laffont et al. (1998a) ). In those two cases, providers use one tool to compete in market shares and one tool to maximize their access revenue. The collusive power of access charges totally disappears in two part tariffs. The positive effect of higher access charges on retail proÞts is totally neutralized by a lower Þxed fee. In a recent paper, Dessein (2002) shows that this proÞt neutrality result is robust to the introduction of customer heterogeneity on demand volumes, but is not when subscription is elastic. In the latter case, there exist network externalities. The 'raising each other cost' effect is reversed : lower access charges decreases usage prices which increases participation rate. This creates a virtuous circle since it enhances attractiveness for new subscribers (network externality effect) and then increases the fee that providers can charge. Firms then collude through low access charges. Gans and King (2001) show that when they compete in non linear pricing and when they can price discriminate between on-net and off-net calls, providers collude through low access charges.
In this paper, we introduce two new components. First, networks are asymmetric by their quality and compete in non linear pricing. They also choose freely the level of their access charge. Consumer's demand depends on the quality of the network they adopt. This leads to the introduction of heterogeneity on demand volumes. Second, consumers do not only value the number of calls they send but also the number they receive. Before taking his adoption decision, a consumer compares the price he pays for his communications and the prices the other pay for calling him. This is at the origin of call externalities.
Little theoretical work has been realized on network competition with call externalities. Hermalin The goal of this paper is twofold. First, we shed a new light on the debate over collusive concern of high access charges. We determine equilibrium pricing with call externalities. We show that providers internalize on-net calls externalities on their own network, but do not for off-net calls. However, by choosing freely his access charge, a provider can internalize off-net call externalities for its consumers. As a result, he can charge low access prices, even below marginal cost, since it increases utility of its consumers and allows him to charge higher Þxed fees. We show that the (non reciprocal) access charge maximizing his proÞt is lower than the cost he bears for terminating calls if his network is relatively small. This corresponds to an implicit subsidy of received calls, against sent calls. However, providers lack instruments and the competitive level of access 5 charge is too high because of a double marginalization effect. Nevertheless, this effect allows us to moderate the risks of tacit collusion when competitors can freely negotiate their access charges.
Second, we bring new arguments to the debate over the optimal design market in telecommunications and more generally in the ICT industry. We show precisely in this paper that a more concentrated industry can improve welfare.
Merging the two telecommunications providers solves the call externalities distortion.. We show that the merger does not affect the on-net calls price on the high quality network whereas it increases the on-net calls price on the low quality network. Off-net prices in both directions are decreased. The merger increases inter network traffic. This positive effect is a positive efficiency effect of the merger which must be put in balance with the traditional competition reduction effect. From a normative point of view, the merger does not affect consumers surplus on the low quality network whereas it improves the situation of consumers on the high quality network (and the global welfare) if they are in high enough proportion.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 is dedicated to network competition. We solve the two stage game in which providers Þrst choose simultaneously their access charge and then compete in non linear tariffs. Section 4 analyses the merger between the two providers. We compute tariffs of the private monopoly resulting from the merger and conduce the welfare analysis. The last section offers some conclusive remarks.
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The model
We consider two interconnected networks of different quality. The highest (lowest) quality is denoted q 1 (q 2 ). For example a mobile telecommunication network is considered of higher quality than a Þxed link network, since it allows mobility.
Fixed link networks can also be of different qualities especially in the case of national interconnected telecommunications networks or in the different components of the Internet. In a general manner, the quality of a network results from the quality of transmission infrastructures, the procedures of traffic re-routing in case of congested networks, or from more qualitative aspects as the quality of relations with consumers.
The marginal cost of a communication on network i is assumed to be constant and is decomposed in the following way : a cost for originating and terminating calls, both equal to c i . The cost in between is normalized to zero. We assume that the Þxed cost for serving a consumer is f i for network i. Each provider has only to bear directly the costs on his network. For a communication between network j and i, Þrm i bears a cost c i for terminating the call and in return bills an access price a i to provider j. The total cost of an on-net call on network i is thus 2c i , while the cost of an off-net call on network i is c i + a j , with i 6 = j.
We allow a i 6 = a j , which means that we do not impose a reciprocity principle.
Competitors can price discriminate between on-net and off-net calls. Each of them proposes a two part tariff where F i is the fee for a consumer adopting network i. The unit price of an on-net call on network i is p i whereas the one of a call originated on network i and terminated on network j isp i . Consumers only pay the calls they send 4 and are supposed to subscribe only to one network. Furthermore, we assume no information asymmetries on costs and demand conditions.
We consider a vertical differentiation model à la Mussa & Rosen [1978] . Consumers heterogeneity, represented by parameter θ, characterizes the willingness to pay for quality. We assume that the more consumers value the quality of communications, the higher is the utility they derive and the more is their willingness to pay for that service. This heterogeneity can also be derived from an income disparity. Consumers with a higher income are disposed to pay more for a higher telecommunication service quality. We limit the analysis to two types of consumers noted θ and θ (θ<θ). Total population is normalized to 1 and is divided exogenously in proportion α of type θ and (1 − α) of type θ.
The utility derived by a consumer adopting a network depends on the quality of the network, the number of calls he can send and the number of calls he receives. Given quantity of calls (sent or received) x, a consumer θ joining network i has utility U θi (x) = θq i W (x), where W (.) is assumed to be non decreasing and concave.
We easily derive demand functions for a consumer θ adopting a network of quality q i , at price p. These are solutions of x θi (p) = arg max
Therefore, indirect utility for a consumerθ sending
and the one for receiving x θ j (p) calls is U θi (x θ j (p)).
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We have the following properties
Proof.
We then have
As θ > θ, this equality is
These two properties have an intuitive interpretation. Demand of individuals increases with respect to the quality of the good. Therefore, for a given price, a consumer θ sends more calls when he adopts a high quality network. Similarly, for a given quantity, demand increases with respect to consumer's willingness to pay. Therefore, for the same network quality, a consumer θ sends more calls than a consumer θ.
We assume, as in most of the existing literature on networks interconnection, an isotropic or balanced calling pattern. This means that if a proportion α (0 ≤ α ≤ 1) of consumers adopt network 1 and (1−α) network 2, the probability for a call originated on network 1 to be terminated on the same network is α and on the network 2 is (1 − α). Under the isotropic calling pattern assumption, if all consumers have the same demand functions and prices are the same on the two networks, then traffic ßows between the two networks are the same 5 .
As already pointed out by Laffont, Rey, Tirole (1998), price discrimination between on-net and off-net calls restores tariff-mediated network externalities.
The utility derived from joining one of the two networks depends on the number of consumers on this network, as this determines the proportion of on-net and off-net calls. The more consumers subscribe to the same network, the higher is the proportion of on-net calls. If the price for on-net calls is lower than it is for off-net calls, then the higher the number of consumers in the same network, the more they send and receive calls. Network externalities induce a coordination problem between consumers who have to make conjectures on the others consumers' behavior. We use a rational expectation concept and at equilibrium those conjectures are correct.
In this paper, we focus only on situations where high type consumers (θ)
adopt the high quality network and low type consumers (θ) adopt the low quality network. In other words, we do not examine the pooling case where both types of consumers coordinate on the same network.
Under these assumptions, if all consumers θ coordinate on network 1, then their individual utility for sending calls is given by:
Utility for consumers θ adopting network 2 for sending calls is:
In order to determine the valuation for received calls, we assume that if a proportion α (respectively 1 − α) of consumers adopt network 1 (resp. 2), each consumer receives 1/α (resp. 1/(1 − α)) of the total ßow terminated on his network. The valuation of received calls is then given by:
We can now write the total indirect utility for a consumer θ or θ depending on the network he chooses to adopt. We make at this stage the following assumption
This assumption means that consumers have the same valuation for the calls they send and receive. On net and off-net calls are supposed to be non substitutable and utility is separable and additive between sent and received calls.
Note also that the utility of consumer θ on network i depends not only on the prices (p i ,p i ) he pays for sending calls, but also on prices other consumers pay to call him (p i ,p j ). This last term is at the origin of call externalities.
We also need to write the indirect utility of a consumer who switches unilaterally to the other network. Ceteris paribus, consumer θ who deviates on network 2 has an indirect utility
while a consumer θ who deviates on network 1 receives an indirect utility
At this stage, we can write the constraints which need to be veriÞed in order to respect the allocation of each type of consumers on each network. Namely, each type of consumer has to verify incentive and individual rationality constraints.
Consumers θ adopt network 1 iff
and
Consumer θ adopts network 2 iff:
We can now write proÞt on networks 1 and 2 if (6), (6), (IR1) and (IR2) hold:
Network Competition
In this section we examine a competitive network market where the two different providers compete in the following game. In a Þrst stage, they choose simultaneously their access charge. In a second stage, they compete simultaneously in two part tariffs. We Þrst derive the tariff competition equilibrium and then discuss the decentralized choices of access charges.
Tariff competition
Let us assume that provider 1 operates the high quality network and provider 2
operates the low quality network. We only focus on a duopoly equilibrium where consumers θ adopt network 1 and consumers θ adopt network 2. Both providers set the fee and prices for on net and off-net calls maximizing their proÞt. As in standard adverse selection models, they are constrained by an individual rationality constraint (IR i ) and incentive constraint an (IC i ) of consumers. Equilibrium prices (p i ,p i , F i ) for provider i are solutions of the following program:
α i is the proportion of consumers on network i. The resolution of this program is not standard as we are not guaranteed that incentives constraints are compatible. Both providers choose their calls prices and the Þxed fee they charge to consumers. We denote (p,p) = (p 1 , p 2 ,p 1 ,p 2 ). The unique duopoly equilibrium candidate for the competition in Þxed fees is such that the individual rationality constraint of consumers θ subscribed to network 2 (IR 2 ) and incentive constraint of consumers θ subscribed to network 1 (IC 1 ) are binding.
Thus for a unique duopoly equilibrium candidate, program for Þrm 1 writes
Let us deÞne function Ψ as:
The following proposition gives equilibrium prices.
there exists a unique duopoly tariff equilibrium with
+∞ otherwise (ii) Otherwise, there does not exist any equilibrium.
Proof : see appendix 1
Recall that marginal costs for on-net and off-net calls on network i are respectively 2c i and c 1 + c 2 . Unit on-net prices are exactly half of marginal cost on both networks. This comes from call externalities : each call is valued not only by the sender but also by the receiver. Providers fully internalize those externalities for on-net calls. Decreasing unit price enhances subscribers' utility and allows to charge a higher Þxed fee. Recall that the valuation of (received or sent) calls depends on the type of consumers and on the quality of the network.
An on-net call has the same value for the sender and for the receiver, as both are of the same type and adopt the same network. Hence, on-net calls are charged at half the marginal cost. It is also interesting to note that the low quality network is never better off cutting communication with the higher quality competitive network.
Competitive access prices
In this section we solve the Þrst stage of the game. Both providers choose simultaneously their access charge. The goal of this section is to discuss the collusive power of access charges.
In most of this literature, authors impose a reciprocity principle, i.e. a 1 = a 2 = a. This assumption has important implications in the comparative static analysis with respect to the access charge. Indeed, increasing the access charge does not only raise the rival's cost but also its own cost. This assumption is the key of the 'raising each other's cost' effect in Armstrong (1998) or in Laffont,
Rey, Tirole (1998a,b) 6 . In our paper, we do not impose this assumption. A provider can raise its rival's cost without raising its own cost. This point is also an important regulatory issue.
In this section, we bring a new light on the risk of use of high access charges for collusive concerns. Indeed, the level of access charge will inßuence the level of off-net calls prices. As in the existing literature, it has an impact on the number of calls consumers will send. But the level of access charges has also an impact on the number of off-net calls consumers will receive. The latter effect acts on call externalities and we show that providers can reduce inefficiencies on call externalities when they can choose freely their access charge.
We determine the access charges maximizing providers' proÞt. At duopoly competitive tariff equilibrium, the proÞt of operator i is continue with respect to access charge and can be written as :
ProÞt depends on the access charge through two terms : the access revenue which writes AR i = (a i − c i )x θ j (p j (a i )) and the fee F d i the provider can charge at competitive equilibrium. We derive the optimal access charge for the two components and for both providers.
At competitive equilibrium, provider 1 binds the incentive constraint and has to give consumers an incentive rent which depends on the access charge. By differentiating F d 1 with respect to a 1 we obtain:
An increase in access charge to network 1 leads to two opposite effects on fee In other words, the price maximizing the subscription fee for terminating a call is independent of its marginal cost.
The access revenue for provider 1 writes
¢ and is concave with respect to a 1 . The access charge maximizing the access revenue is clearly above the marginal cost c 1 . Remark that the maximization of the access revenue yields to a double marginalization problem. Note also that both access charge maximizing the subscription fee and the access revenue are independent of a 2 .
Provider 2 :
At competitive equilibrium, provider 2 binds the individual rationality constraint for low type consumers. Differentiating F d 2 with respect to a 2 yields
Since only the individual rationality constraint is binding at equilibrium, provider 2 faces only a receiving calls effect. The higher its access charge, the less its consumers will receive calls from network 1's consumers, the lower is their utility and the lower is the fee he can charge. The subscription fee F d 2 is then always decreasing with its access charge a 2 . As for provider 1, the access revenue is concave with respect to the access charge. The access charge maximizing the access revenue is clearly above the marginal cost. As for provider 1, it is independent of the rival's access charge.
The following proposition summarizes those results for both providers. ii) Access charge to network 2 is above the marginal cost for terminating
is the price elasticity of demand for consumers θ computed for access charge a i equal to marginal cost c i .
Proof : see appendix 2
The decentralized choice of the access charge by providers leads to two opposite effects. On the one hand, it induces a double marginalization problem on off-net prices. Each provider charges a price for off-net calls : the sending provider through the usage price and the receiving provider through the access charge. This creates an incentive to increase access charges. On the other hand, as providers use two part tariffs, they can capture a part of their consumer surplus. If surplus is decreasing with respect to usage prices, this creates an incentive not to charge too high access charge. More precisely, each call sent by a customer generates a call externality for the receiver. We have shown in the previous section that each provider internalizes those call externalities for on-net calls on its own network. As a result unit prices for on-net calls are half the marginal cost because call externalities within networks are not internalized.
Unit off-net calls prices do not take into account the call externality. However, 20 those prices depend on the access charge for terminating calls. By choosing freely its access charge, a provider can inßuence off-net calls unit prices. In other words, choosing freely its access charge allows him to internalize off-net call externalities. He can thus reduce the distortion due to externalities. Note that there subsists a distortion since each provider faces a trade-off between maximizing the subscription fee and the access revenue. Access charge is then only one tool for many objectives. More precisely, the optimal access charge for each provider depends on the binding constraint at tariff equilibrium.
Provider 2's subscription fee only depends on the call externalities. Close to marginal cost c 2 , an increase in the access charge a 2 enhances the access revenue but decreases the subscription fee provider 2 can charge. The equilibrium access charge to network 2 is above marginal cost if enough consumers choose network 2 relatively to those on the rival's network (α/ (1 − α)).
Provider 1's subscription fee does not only depend on call externalities but also on the incentive rent (v θ 2 −v θ 2 ) he has to give to its consumers. When choosing its access charge a 1 , provider 1 has only one instrument for three objectives :
reducing the incentive rent, internalizing call externalities and maximizing its access revenue. It is easy to verify that
< 0. An increase in the access charge increases the off-net price which decreases the incentive rent. If the proportion of consumers on network 2 is high, customers on network 1 receive an important proportion of calls from network 2 (off-net calls). Provider 1 gains to charge a low access charge below the marginal cost, even if it implies an access deÞcit. The access deÞcit is compensated by higher subscriptions revenues. Re-mark also that the thresholdᾱ is decreasing with the price elasticity of demand for low type consumers on network 2 ξ xθ 2 . The lower ξ xθ 2 , the more provider 1 charges an access charge below marginal cost.
Our results have important implications from a regulatory or competition policy point of view. Access charges can be used as a tool of tacit collusion by the 'raise each other's cost effect' (or the double marginalization effect).
Access charges are also a tool for both providers to internalize call externalities.
The latter effect counterbalances the former and contributes to moderate the risk of collusive power of access charges. It speaks for a decentralized and free determination of access charges level by providers. Note also that a regulation of access charges taking into account such call externalities effects does not seem realistic in terms of informational requirements.
As in all externalities problems, one solution to annihilate distortion is to merge parties. In the following section, we address the question of merging telecommunication operators.
Mergers analysis
In this section, we discuss the effects of a merger between the two networks.
Traditionally, a merger leads to two opposite effects : a decrease in competition in the market and possible efficiency gains. Literature on mergers and antitrust authorities practices focus on costs reduction (see e.g. Farrell-Shapiro (1990)).
Our main result here is to characterize a new potential positive effect of mergers 22 through the reduction of distortion on call externalities. The merger between the two networks leads to Þrm m. This Þrm acts as an unregulated monopoly.
For clarity's sake, we Þrst derive optimal prices for the merger Þrm under the benchmark of complete information and then we introduce asymmetric information.
Benchmark
We Þrst consider the benchmark case of complete information. The objective of the merging entity is then to maximize the joint proÞts
Note that since this Þrm uses two part tariffs, this program is the Þrst best solution. Both individual rationality constraints are binding at equilibrium.
The solution of this program is given in the following lemma.
Lemma 3 Under complete information, the merging entity fully internalizes call externalities. Usage prices are
Proof. see appendix 3
This Þrst best benchmark allows to exhibit optimal prices which internalize perfectly all call externalities. Similarly to the competitive case, on-net calls are charged at half the marginal cost since the valuation of an on-net call is the same for the sender and for the receiver. Results are different for off-net calls which are valued differently by sender and receiver as they are of different types and adopt different network's quality. For example off-net calls from network 1 to network 2 are valued U θ 1 (x θ 1 (p 1 )) by the sender and U θ 2 (x θ 1 (p 1 )) by the receiver. The externality arising from received calls depends on both types θ and θ and both qualities q 1 and q 2 . Note also thatp 1 <p 2 . This is explained by the fact that calls valuation is higher for consumers θ on network 1 than for consumers on network 2. Then the externality is larger for calls received by high type consumers.
Note that this Þrst best outcome could be achieved by regulating access charges in a perfect world without asymmetric information. Indeed, competitive on-net prices are optimal since providers use two-part tariff and fully internalize call externalities for on-net calls. Optimal access charges are thus implementing
Þrst best off-net prices, i.e.p 
Optimal access charges are below marginal cost in order to internalize call externalities. This analysis constitutes only a benchmark. Introducing asymmetric information on costs or demand parameters goes beyond the goal of this paper. 
Imperfect discrimination
Consider now the more realistic case where the monopoly cannot perfectly price discriminate between consumers. We show how asymmetric information affects the internalization of call externalities. In order to compare it with the competitive case, we focus only on the case of separating contracts. As the monopoly uses two part tariffs, this problem is the same as the second best program.
Program of the merging entity writes
This problem is quite similar to a classical adverse selection problem. The individual rationality constraint of the low type (θ) and the incentive constraint of the high type (θ) will be binding. However, compatibility between incentives constraints (IC 1 ) and (IC 2 ) requires the following constraint :
Using (IR 2 ) and (IC 1 ) , Þxed fees are given by
The program writes
In order to compare the two market structures, we limit ourselves to the case where the constraint is not binding 7 . We denote λ the Lagrange multiplier of the compatibility constraint. In the following, we only develop the particular case where this constraint is not binding (λ = 0) . We refer the reader to appendix 2 for the general case.
Lemma 4 Under incomplete information, the merger entity fully internalizes call externalities. If demand function is not too convex, prices are given by Proof : see appendix 3.
Only the on-net calls price on the high quality network is not distorted by the informational rent. Furthermore, we Þnd the standard result of no distortion 26 at top only for on-net calls for high type. All other prices are then affected by the informational rent (v θ2 − v θ 2 ) which must be conceded to type θ.
In order to quantify the direction of this distortion, we show that :
We see that the on-net calls price on network 1 p 1 has no effect neither on utility v θ2 or on v θ 2 . Thus this price is not distorted by the informational rent.
In contrast, off-net calls prices for calling network 2 from network 1p 1 affect both Note also that the proÞt of the merger is higher than the sum of the proÞt made by competitive networks. This comes from the traditional arguments of price competition relaxation and of the minimization of the incentive rent conceded to high type consumers. But it also comes from the full internalization of all call externalities This gives a new interpretation of the high bids recently observed in telecommunications mergers. This point has an important implications for competition policy.
Welfare analysis
We extend the analysis to address the question of the welfare effects of a merger between two telecommunications operators. This has been a key question and remains a relevant policy issue, in light of the recent mergers wave in the ICT industry. We compare the merger with a totally decentralized market structure where Þnal and access prices are chosen freely by providers.
Mergers are generally analyzed by antitrust authorities under the trade-off between the competitive pressure reduction and potential efficiency gains. The latter are traditionally evaluated in terms of cost reductions. We do not address this question in this paper. We highlight another source of efficiency gains based on call externalities and better pricing strategy.
The analysis in terms of global welfare is decomposed into two effects. The
Þrst effect of our analysis concerns the incentive rent. The merging entity optimizes the informational rent using the three pricesp 1 ,p 2 , p 2 whereas competitive provider 1 can only use one direct instrumentp 1 and an indirect tool a 1 which inßuencesp 2 . The monopoly has then more tools to optimize the incentive rent.
Moreover, even if competitor 1 can inßuencep 2 through its access charge a 1 , he has other goals. The incentive rent is only one the three objectives when he determines the optimal a 1 (the two other objectives are the access revenue and the internalization of call externalities). The second effect is the perfect internalization of all call externalities by the merging entity. This enhances the gross utility of subscribers. The following lemma compares prices in both 28 market structures.
Proof : see appendix 4.
The on-net price p 1 is not affected by the merger since the competitive operator fully internalizes on-net call externalities and this price does not affect the incentive rent. In contrast, the on-net price on network 2 p 2 after the merger is modiÞed by the incentive rent let to high type consumers. This term
We conclude that on-net price for network 2 is lower in the competitive market structure (p
The comparison for off-net prices is less direct since it depends on the level of access charges. The merging entity fully internalizes call externalities which tends to reduce off-net prices. It uses the marginal cost as internal prices for charging access to the other network and uses directly the three usage prices p 1 , p 1 ,p 2 to balance the incentive rent and the call externalities effect. Competitive providers also internalize call externalities if they can choose freely their access charge. But as we saw in the previous section, the level of their access charge is increased by the double marginalization effect. Access charges are then chosen at too high a level. This distortion mainly comes from a lack of instruments in the competitive market structure. Off-net prices are then higher in the competitive
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The following proposition gives the normative implication of a merger between the two providers.
Proposition 6 (i) Consumers' net surplus on the low quality network is not affected by the merger.
(ii) Consumers' net surplus on the high quality network is increased iff Global welfare variation can be written as ∆W = ∆π+α∆S 1 +(1 − α) ∆S 2 = ∆π + α∆S 1 since ∆S 2 = 0 (S i denotes the surplus of consumers on network i).
ProÞts are higher under the merger but high type consumer's surplus can be lower. Therefore, the global effect of the merger on total welfare is ambiguous.
The merger increases the global welfare if consumer's surplus loss is counterbalanced by proÞt gains. This is the case if the weight of inter network traffic is sufficiently high or if the proportion of consumers on network 1 is high enough.
Conclusion
This model shows that providers internalize on-net calls externalities on their own network, but not off-net calls. However, by choosing freely its access charge, a provider internalize incoming off-net call externalities for its consumers. Providers can gain by charging low access prices below marginal cost since it improves their consumers' utility and allows them to charge higher Þxed fees. However, providers lack instruments and the competitive level of access charge is too high because of a double marginalization effect. However, this result contributes to moderating the risk of high access charges for collusive concerns.
Merging the two telecommunications providers solves the call externalities distortion. We have shown that the merger does not affect the on-net calls price on the high quality network whereas it increases the on-net calls price on the low quality network. Off-net prices in both directions are lower. The merger then increases inter network traffic. It does not affect consumers' surplus on the low quality network whereas it improves the situation of consumers on the high quality network (and the global welfare) if they are in high enough proportion.
The lessons drawn from our model would be robust to changes, including the extension to a continuum of heterogeneous consumers in their demand.
However, aggregating individual demand would lead to technical difficulties. Let us Þrst write the following properties:
Here we solve the tariff competition game. A Nash equilibrium duopoly is a vector of
for which all consumers θ coordinate on network 1 and all consumers θ on network 2. In other words, at equilibrium, the four incentive and individual rationality constraints (IR1), (IC1), (IR2), (IC2) have to be veriÞed.
At equilibrium, unit prices 
It is straightforward to see that the unique equilibrium fees are given by binding (IC1) and (IR2).
• Now let us derive equilibrium unit prices given equilibrium fees.
Program for Þrm 1 writes:
First order conditions write :
Using (9) and (11), this writes:
As second order crossed derivatives are zero, second order conditions write
Program for Þrm 2 writes max {p2,p2}
Using (9) and (10), this writes:
We derivep
Second order conditions write
• We now show that this equilibrium candidate is the unique duopoly equilibrium. Let us assume that (p * ,p * ) is a unit price equilibrium such that the four
We know from the previous result that the unique equilibrium fees are such that (IC2) and (IR1) are binding. But the best response to those equilibrium fees are
is the unique duopoly equilibrium. Otherwise, there does not exist any duopoly equilibrium.
Appendix 2 : proof of proposition 2
The global proÞt of operator 1 is Þrst increasing and then decreasing with respect to a 1 . Let us write the derivative for a 1 close to the marginal cost:
Three effects can be set out. The Þrst two are positive and respectively affect the access revenue and the incentive rent. The last is negative and represents the call externalities effect. The optimal access charge is above marginal cost iff
We now compute the derivative of the global proÞt of provider 2 close to the marginal cost c 2 . 
Both individual rationality constraints are binding.
First order conditions write:
which writes using (9)
Using (9) and (10) As second order crossed derivatives are zero, second order conditions write 
+ 2 dx θi (p i ) dp i ] = 2 dx θi (p i ) dp i < 0 ] dx θ 1 (p 1 ) dp 1 < 0
Proof of lemma 4
The second best program under asymmetric information writes max pi,b pi
38 First order conditions write :
(x θ1 (p 1 )) − 2c 1 i dx θ1 (p 1 ) dp 1 = 0
i } dx θ 1 (p1) dp 1
= 0
We derivep (x θ2 (p 2 )) − p 2´d
Using (9) and (10), this writes: Using (9) and (10), this writes:
= 2 dx θ1 (p 1 ) dp 1 + (2p 1 − 2c 1 ) d 2 x θ1 (p 1 ) dp 2 1 = 2 dx θ1 (p 1 ) dp 1 < 0using (15)
x θ1 (p 1 ) dp 1 x θ 1 (p 1 ) dp 1 using (16)
Note that this condition is the same than the one which guarantees thatp m 1 > 0.
x θ 2 (p 2 )/dp 2 +α dx θ2 (p 2 ) dp 2 < 0 which can be written close to p
ProÞt is then locally concave with respect to p 2 iff demand is not too convex. 
